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Abstract
According to Ronald Inglehart, countries move towards more post-materialist values as their GDP per
capita increases. There are some problems with his measurement. First of all, it is hard to say whether one
country is objectively more or less materialist than another. Originally, Inglehart included in his 1970
analysis only seven OECD countries, which could be said to have a common value dimension. However,
when the same indicators are applied within a different culture (Eastern Europe), they could be interpreted
differently by the public. Second, Inglehart admits, referring to the 1973 oil crisis, that his indicators are
sensitive to short-term economic fluctuations. I argue that by Inglehart's own logic the indicators are too
sensitive within the post-Socialist context right now. This sensitivity undermines the validity of his
measurement. Both these difficulties pose a question whether it is at all possible to compare Western and
Eastern Europe on the materialist/post-materialist continuum.
Kurzfassung
Ronald Inglehart zufolge, bewegen sich Länder stärker in Richtung post-materialistischer Werte, wenn ihr
BIP pro Kopf ansteigt. Diese Form der Messung wirft jedoch eine Reihe von Problemen auf. Zuallererst ist
es schwierig zu sagen, ob ein Land objektiv mehr oder weniger materialistisch ist als ein anderes.
Ursprünglich umfasste Ingleharts Analyse aus dem Jahre 1970 auch bloß sieben OECD-Länder, von denen
man eine gemeinsame Wertedimension behaupten könnte. Legt man jedoch dieselben Indikatoren
innerhalb einer anderen Kultur (Osteuropa) an, könnten sie durch die Öffentlichkeit verschieden
interpretiert werden. Zweitens, wie Inglehart mit Verweis auf die Ölkrise von 1979 zugibt, reagieren diese
Indikatoren sensibel auf ökonomische Kurzzeit-Schwankungen. Ich behaupte, dass durch Ingleharts eigene
Logik diese Indikatoren innerhalb des post-sozialistischen Kontextes augenblicklich zu sensibel sind.
Diese Sensibilität untergräbt die Gültigkeit seiner Messung. Diese beiden Schwierigkeiten werfen die
Frage auf, ob es überhaupt möglich ist, West- und Osteuropa am materialistisch / post-materialistischen
Kontinuum zu vergleichen. 
The author
Ioannis Kyvelidis is Ph.D. student at the Government Department of Cornell University; email:
ik33@cornell.edu
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1. Introduction
Political culture is a very important subfield in comparative politics. The largest and longest project
regularly measuring the levels of materialism and post/materialism was undertaken by Ronald Inglehart
since 1970, and a number of surveys, such as the World Values Survey and Euro-Barometer, and later ISSP
included Inglehart’s original battery of four indicators of materialism/post-materialism. Originally, the
World Values Survey was conducted in only eight West European countries: West Germany, France,
Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Britain, and Ireland. However, from the countries of the former
Socialist bloc before and immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union extensive data measuring
political opinion were not available. At least for the last ten to fifteen years some data have been collected
on the countries that once constituted the Soviet bloc. 
The subject of political culture was to some extent ignored by the scholars of post-Socialism. This paper
tries to illuminate (by no means to solve) some difficulties in measuring differences in materialism (and
postmaterialism) between the countries of Western Europe and the former Soviet bloc. The paper also
empirically tests differences across the post-Socialist countries and measures how differences in some
variables (other than the GDP per capita) could affect and explain the level and variations of post-Soviet
materialism. In particular, the paper shows that although there are some interesting and significant
differences in materialism between Western and Eastern Europe, explaining these differences is no simple
task. 
A number of questions with regard to materialism in the post-Soviet bloc arise: Considering high inflation
and economic collapse, is it due to the scarcity effect that the bloc scores higher on materialism now
compared to the West? If not short-term period effects, could the bloc be less materialist compared to the
West? Is generational effect of materialism in the bloc largely due to the scarcity or socialization
hypothesis? Is the region moving towards materialism or post-materialism? Is the original battery of
indicators too sensitive to post-Socialist development? 
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The paper argues that, perhaps, the original battery of indicators is not enough to test those questions
conclusively. 
First, let us begin with a simple comparison of Western European and East European countries on the
materialist/postmaterialist continuum. The level of materialism will be replicated anew by using Inglehart’s
methodology and his original battery of questions. 
According to Inglehart, societies embrace post-materialist values as they move towards more economic
security and affluence. Inglehart proposed two hypotheses: the socialization and the scarcity hypotheses.
According to the scarcity hypothesis, "individual priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment."(1) The
scarcity hypothesis implies short-term changes of period effects: “periods of prosperity lead to increase in
post-materialism.” The socialization hypothesis implies that one's values reflect the conditions of preadult
years. In other words, core value formation takes place in one’s preadult years and is influenced by the
predominant values of the time. According to Inglehart, because older Western generations experienced
economic and social insecurity during their preadult years, they tend to be closer to the materialist end of the
continuum compared to the younger cohorts. Younger post-war generations tend to be less materialist due to
relatively high levels of economic and social security. 
Let us measure the level of materialism in the post-Socialist countries and compare the difference between
age cohorts within the post-socialist states themselves and between the East and West regions. However,
before measuring the level of materialism in the bloc, I would like to draw our attention to two possible
results. 
3
1. Because older Socialist generations did not enjoy high level of material prosperity during the time of
their value formation, we might expect them to score higher on materialism compared to younger
cohorts. That pattern would correspond to the one observed in Western Europe and agree with the
socialization hypotheses. In addition, older post-Socialist cohorts of Eastern Europe and the former
USSR currently constitute the “truly disadvantaged” of the post-Socialist transition. In that case,
higher materialist scores among the older groups can be simply explained as a period effect (the
scarcity hypothesis). At the same time, younger post-Socialist cohorts are currently better-off
compared to the older cohorts, they could be expected to score lower on materialism. Also, they grew
up under relative economic security during the last decades of Socialism and internalized more
post-materialist values. 
2. However, a second and totally opposite expectation can be observed. One can argue that older
Socialist cohorts may score higher on post-materialism. First of all, although older generations did not
enjoy high economic prosperity, they were living under considerable social protection and security.
Things such as medical care, education, housing, and utilities were free or mostly free (unlike now).
The workload and the general “pace of life” under Socialism were considerably less stressful. In other
words, although the older cohorts did not enjoy excessive material wealth, nevertheless they had no
need to care about everyday survival. In short, a sense of security and economic well-being did not
correlate perfectly in the socialist context. Second, the “indoctrination factor” also must not be
forgotten. For example, the regime undoubtedly was committed to economic prosperity on the
national level. At the individual level, however, the picture was more complex. Socialist ideology by
default cannot give a substantial support to and praise materialist values on the individual level. The
best support to it was the negative portrayal of the capitalist West, its ideology and lifestyles that
featured social injustice, interpersonal competition and strife towards material accumulation. (Of
course I did not forget that a lot of this kind of portrayal was a part of the cold war.) 
Thomas Weisskopf, for example, in a very good way describes Socialist values: “Collective and/or
non-material gains incentives predominated. Work was motivated primarily by a) the prospects for material
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oneself (satisfaction from work activity, esteem from peers, honor, etc.)” Thus, for the older cohorts
internalized socialist values could be associated with post-materialism.(2) Richard Rose and Ellen
Carnaghan showed in their study that generational difference in political attitudes are similar from one
former communist country to another. From the study we can infer that “Sovietization,” or indoctrination
(propaganda), could be an important factor in value formation.(3) 
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Social scientists are seriously constrained in their research on the post-Socialist region due to the consistent
lack of good, reliable time series data. Because the World Values Survey was administered in many
post-Socialist countries only once (1995-1997), a time-series analysis is not possible if we consider the
WVS alone. Therefore, several surveys are pooled together in this study. First, the 1993 ISSP Environment
Survey (International Social Study Program, ZA study 2458) was used to test differences on the
materialist/postmaterialist continuum between Western democracies and post-Socialist states. The survey
includes the original four-value battery from the World Values Survey. Participating countries are Australia,
Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, UK, and the US. SPSS 10 for Windows was
used for this analysis. First, the variable "country" was recoded as 1 and 2, with 1 indicating countries which
did not belong to the former Soviet bloc. When analyzing either Western or Eastern Europe, the other
variable was filtered. Next, the variable "age" was recoded as "lowest through 24=1, 25-34=2, 35-44=3,
45-54=4, 55-64=5, 65 through highest=6." (No cases were missing). 
The respondents were asked two rank-type questions (not to be confused with scale-type questions) to
choose the highest and next-to-the-highest priority indicator out of a choice among four values (two
materialist and two postmaterialist).(4) The values are 1) maintaining order in the nation, 2) giving the
people more say in government decisions, 3) fighting rising prices, 4) protecting freedom of speech. 
According to Inglehart's original methodology, people fall into the materialist category if they choose
materialist indicators both first and second times in either order. Similarly, one is coded as a post-materialist
when choosing two postmaterialist indicators. Respondents who choose one materialist and the other
postmaterialist (or vice versa) indicators are coded as "mixed." 
Running simple crosstabulation by cohort with one layer (next highest priority) gives us the number of
highest priority responses according to the second priority. That way it is possible to calculate individuals
who chose materialist values as second and first priorities combined (the same is possible for
post-materialists). The number of cases in each cohort is calculated, and "Can't choose" and "Refused" are
deducted as missing responses. Percentages of “pure” materialist/post-materialist responses are calculated by
dividing the corresponding number in each cohort against the total number of respondents in the cohort. 
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Table I (5)
Table II 
The trends of the analysis of Western democracies support Inglehart's predictions. As the age of the
respondents increases, support for materialist values rises. For example, the first and youngest cohort in the
West there are 16% materialists and 15% postmaterialists, while the oldest cohort has 27% and 11%
respectively. Overall, Western democracies are 21% materialist and 8% postmaterialist. 
The analysis of Eastern Europe shows similar trends. The level of materialism increases with age. The
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and only 1% post-materialist. On average, Eastern Europe is 47% materialist and 5% post-materialist. The
conclusion can be drawn that the second expectation did not hold true: older cohorts are not more
post-materialist compared to the young. 
What is also striking about these results is that 1) post-Socialist countries score much higher on materialism
compared to the West, and 2) the gap between materialists and post-materialists in the East is huge and
widening with age. Compared to the West, post-Socialist countries score less on post-materialism and more
on materialism in any given age group. The gap between materialists and post-materialists in East European
countries is 47-5=42, and 21-8=13 in the West. 
What explains such high level of materialism in Eastern Europe, especially among the older public? Let us
try to explain the phenomenon by applying the two original hypotheses. 
2. Measuring Crossregional Materialism: A Snapshot Analysis
According to Inglehart, post-materialism over the long run positively correlates with economic prosperity of
a nation. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, there is a strong relationship between GDP per capita and the level of
materialism: 
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Figure 1
The Y-axis indicates %materialism minus %postmaterialism. (6) According to the ISSP 1993 Environment
Survey the most materialist country is Russia (62%-1%=61%) just a little bit above Bulgaria (58%). Overall,
the East European nations are concentrated in the upper-left corner, with lower GDP per capita and higher
materialist scores. Also, we can see that the East European nations are arranged diagonally from the upper
left to lower right according to their GDP per capita and materialist scores. As Figure 2 shows, even with
only a handful of post-Socialist nations included in the ISSP 1993 Environment Survey the relationship
between income per capita and materialism is clearly observable. Here GDP per capita values were taken
from the 1993 World Fact Book. 
Figure 2
But at this point some of the abovementioned questions begin to arise. In particular, why do the
post-Socialist countries score so high on materialism? What are the generational differences? 
A closer examination of the data reveals some interesting details. For example, nowhere did Inglehart test
the relationship between materialism and cohort income within countries. Do old people in general and
post-Socialist cohorts in particular “vote” materialist just because of their considerably low incomes relative
to the young (scarcity hypothesis)? Or do the older post-Socialist cohorts vote materialist because of early
childhood shortages? 
Indeed, a simple regression analysis of two arbitrarily pulled out countries (Bulgaria and Russia) shows that
personal income is dropping with age at perfect 0.000 significance. A simple comparison of means shows
that Russia’s and Bulgaria’s population earnings significantly decrease with age: 
Table III 
Table IV 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between income and age in Eastern Europe as a whole: 
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Figure 3
In the US, income seems to drop down slightly in the oldest cohort, but overall personal income increases
with age. 
Table V 
Income appears to increase with age for all Western democracies included in the 1993 ISSP survey (Figure
4): 
Figure 4 
A conclusion can be made that if in the West the elderly tend to be more materialist, that indeed could be
due to experienced shortages during one’s early socialization years (the socialization hypothesis). (7)
However, in the post-Socialist region the elderly may score high on materialism due to early life shortages
and current shortages of basic needs. A sharp income drop with age in post-Socialist societies can be best
explained by one major factors: pensioners are living well below the poverty level due to inadequate
pensions plus arrears in pension payments. Besides, the chances of finding employment for the elderly in,
for example, Russia, are very limited, so that the elderly have no means for improving their financial
situation. 
The fact that post-materialism drops with decreasing GDP could speak in favor of Inglehart’s original
findings. So far we have seen that the relatively low GDP per capita is responsible for high levels of
materialism in the post-Socialist region. Also, the elderly are susceptible to period effects (inflation, very
low income, collapsed social services, little social protection). 
However, the level of materialism can be artificially boosted by the fact that the original battery of questions
is too sensitive to the post-Socialist development during the 1990s. To put it in a different way, the two
materialist indicators - “maintaining order in the nation” and “fighting rising prices” - are too sensitive to the
post-socialist context, which makes period effects very powerful. Both the young and old get affected. 
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For example, considering Russia’s development from 1990 to the present, without even looking at the
analysis it is just natural to expect Russians to score high on both indicators. First of all, in the first 8 years
after the USSR collapsed, Russian authorities were compelled to reprint and change Russian currency twice
just to keep up with skyrocketing inflation of 2500% in selected years (1993). Recently, Russia again
changed its currency, this time canceling out the unnecessary zeroes. Thus, “fighting rising prices” is a
painful subject to Russian citizens. Of course, post-Socialist inflation was not unique to Russia; it was a
phenomenon in the former Soviet bloc and applies to virtually all post-Socialist societies. 
Considering the second materialist indicator (order in the nation), rising crime and corruption, the collapse
of the USSR, general instability and lawlessness in Russia, post-Soviet republics, and Eastern Europe make
the indicator way too sensitive. With two wars in Chechnya (1994-1996 and the current war) it would be
silly to assume that Russia would score low on “keeping order in the nation,” especially after 1994 on. 
The problem is a methodological one: between the indicators and the context. For example, Harold Clarke at
al. argue that although Inglehart recognized the sensitivity of the battery to high rates of inflation, he has not
appreciated that the measure is also affected when the overall economic context is changing. Thus, when
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three, none of which deals with, say, inflation or other economic concerns they may have.(8) In our cases,
however, the battery is too sensitive to the context. The problem stays, but its polarity reversed: the battery is
registering too much materialism. 
This fact is important for the next reason. The original battery of questions was at first administered across 8
different countries, but, arguably, within a similar economic and cultural context, including recessions. The
materialist measurement is subjective across countries since the battery measures not the objective level of
materialism, but the level of materialism as it relates to the level of postmaterialism. However, due to the
similar cultural and economic context, it was possible to assume that perhaps the 8 original countries were
either 1) objectively similar according to their level of materialism, or 2) had no major social or economic
disruptions. 
The picture changes when the battery is administered cross-culturally, i.e., Eastern and Western Europe. It
would be too hasty to assume that since the post-Socialist region scored higher on materialism, it is more
materialist compared to the West. First of all, cultural interpretation of the same indicators could be
different, or a set of concrete short-term circumstances may drastically affect people’s responses. 
9
Inglehart himself confessed that the first battery of four indicators might be too sensitive to short-term
inflation fluctuations. He writes that “when formulating the questions in 1969, [he] did not anticipate the
explosive worldwide inflation that would later take place” [in 1973 and 1979]. During those times, the level
of materialism rose sharply and rapidly (as much as 25%) among the Western public. However, the Western
public did not have to worry much about order in their nations. Considering that the inflation rates in Russia
and Eastern Europe were significantly higher during the transition than in the West, plus the second
indicator of materialism (national order) kicks in, it is no wonder that today the East leads on those
materialist issues. A conclusion can be made that any cross-cultural comparison of materialism can only be
valid if the indicators are not so much susceptible to short-term fluctuation of the measured factors (i.e.
prices and social stability). Otherwise, other indicators should be used. 
Apart from the original four-value battery of indicators, Inglehart introduced two more batteries, which were
administered less frequently in the surveys. The wording of the second battery of indicators seems to be less
sensitive to inflation and national order. However, post-Socialist public again scored much higher on
materialism compared to the West. Two post-materialist indicators (Progress towards a less impersonal and
humane society, and Progress towards society where ideas count more than money) can be more reflective
of truly socialist values which the older cohorts may have grown up with and internalized (unlike freedom of
speech and more say to the people). Maybe older generations would score higher on postmaterialism when
using the second battery? However, the materialist indicators are still quite sensitive to the post-Socialist
economic and social conditions (Stable economy, and Fight against crime). 
Unfortunately, the 1993 ISSP Environment survey does not include the second battery of materialist
indicators. The 1995 wave of the World Values Survey (1995) is used instead. In the 1995 WVS includes
more Eastern European countries than the 1993 ISSP: Hungary, Tambov region (Russia), Belarus, Czech
Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and all former Yugoslavia republics. There seems to be no trend difference in the
post-Socialist responses to the second battery in 1995 compared to the first battery 1993 ISSP survey.
Materialism increases with age and postmaterialism decreases. The neighborhood of the numbers is roughly
the same compared to the results from the first battery of 1993 ISSP: the region scores very high on
materialism. 
Table VI
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The fact that postmaterialism drops with increasing age (or decreasing income) for post-Socialist countries
speaks strongly in favor of the scarcity hypothesis. Still, later we shall consider some other cross-regional
indicators of materialism. 
3. Time-Series Analysis  
Is the post-Socialist region moving towards materialism or post-materialism? Is it possible to trace changes
in post-Socialist materialism through time and its relationship to the change in GDP per capita for Eastern
Europe? Unfortunately, the WVS was not taken in most Socialist countries in 1990-1991, and only in
Hungary in 1981. Almost the entire post-Socialist region (with few exceptions) was covered in the 1995
wave of WVS. The table below represents the calculated difference between materialism-postmaterialism
(first battery) collected from the 1990 and 1995 waves of WVS with ISSP 1993 Environment Survey (here
materialism minus postmaterialism): 
Table VII (9)
Given the previously mentioned relationship between GDP per capita from 1993 ISSP Survey, it is possible
to say that the relationship holds in Eastern Europe throughout time. For example, there is a relationship
between the 1995 level of materialism and GDP per capita at 0.1 significance, although the R-square is
rather small, reflecting a scattered relationship: 
Figure 5
However, as we see, with so many missing values for 1990 and 1993, it is impossible to do a good time
series analysis and to accurately measure either a change in materialism by age cohorts or the difference in
materialism through time in Eastern Europe. The survey was not conducted in the former USSR republics in
1990 or 1993, and GDP are not available as well since in 1990 they still constituted a whole country: the
USSR. For example, it is impossible to correlate the level of materialism and GDP per capita in 1990 for the
Soviet bloc, for the data are available for four countries only (see the table). 
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However, looking carefully at the filled cells in Table I, we can see that Inglehart’s scarcity hypothesis holds
true and materialism is responsive to the fluctuations in GDP per capita. As GDP per capita dropped in most
of the countries from 1990 to 1995 (except for Poland), the level of materialism rose in all of them but
Poland! Poland scored 0.46 on materialism with GDP of $4,400, and then 0.35 in 1995 with GDP of $4,920.
In Slovenia materialism was falling from 0.23 in 1990 to 0.17 in 1993 and to 0.5 in 1995, while GDP per
capita dropped from $10,700 in 1993 to 8,110 in 1995. However, in 1999 GDP was already $11,800 dollars.
3.1. Different indicators: different results! 
Is the post-Socialist region indeed more materialist compared to the West? Are there better indicators for
materialism? Which directions is the region moving? 
What should not be ignored by analysts is that there are also other indicators which, arguably, could be used
to measure the levels of materialism and post-materialism. For example, it is quite interesting why Inglehart
has just two hypotheses, the one reflecting past experiences and the other reflecting present economic
experiences. Just to complete the set, I suggest a “looking-into-the-future” hypothesis: materialism does not
depend on the current economic conditions, but subjectively expected future economic predictions of the
population. 
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materialism in 1995. Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 6 November 1995 was used for that purpose. The
question was “Do you think in the next 12 month your financial situation will be 
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1. a lot better, 
2. better, 
3. the same, 
4. worse, and 
5. a lot worse.” 
I recoded expectations percentages by using the next formula: 
Expectations 1995 = 
= (worse + a lot worse – better – a lot better) / total – the same
A simple linear regression model with the 1995 GDP per capita and the 1995 expectations variable as the
independent variables and the level of materialism as the dependent variable showed that people’s
expectations are perhaps a better predictor of materialism (N = 14): 
materialism 95 = 0.544 - 0.000040 gdp95 + 0.217 expectations 
Predictor Coef StDev T P VIF
Constant 0.54369 0.07171 7.58 0.000
gdp95 -0.00003964 0.00001579 -2.51 0.029 1.2
expectat95 0.21726 0.07600 2.86 0.016 1.2
Figure 6 
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As we can see, the P-value is smaller (0.016) for the expectations compared to 0.029 of 1995 GDP. It means
that the relationship is more significant for the former. 
The Pearson correlation also favors expectations rather than GDP: 
Correlations (Pearson) 
  material95 expectat
expectat 0.441  
gdp95 -0.431 0.336
Thus, materialism is positively related to the percentage of “worse” expectations, while it is negatively
related to the GDP level. In absolute values, the relationship is stronger between materialism and
expectations. Further research is needed to show if the relationship holds true for other time snapshots as
well. 
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more materialist compared to the West? One begins to have second thoughts on the issue after having
looked at indicators other than the original battery.(10) Looking at other indicators that could quite possibly
measure materialism, the issue becomes at most inconclusive. For example, the World Values Survey allows
people to choose job aspects that people consider important. The aspects include good pay, not too much
pressure, respect by people, job security, initiative, good hours, holidays, self realization, responsibility,
interesting job, matching one’s abilities. The respondents choose which aspects they think are important. 
I did a simple crosstabulation of those responses by region (Western Europe and the post-Socialist region)
and found the next results: 
Table VIII
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As we can see, the post-Socialist public are more willing to appreciate initiative on the job, self realization,
more willing to accept responsibility, and less appreciative of either pay or security. 
Let us consider the most blunt materialist job aspect: pay. Could it be a good indicator of materialism? The
indicator also shows the generational trend in Western and the post-Socialist region: for older respondents
"pay" is more important. Here is the generational effect for the West: 
Table IX
A similar generational effect is observed for the post-Socialist region: older groups favor "pay" as an
important job aspect. However, the most interesting fact is that in 1995 Western Europe scored higher on the
indicator compared to the 1990, but the post-Socialist region scored lower in 1995. Thus, contrary to the
original Inglehart finding, the West had moved towards materialism, and the post-Soviet societies had
moved towards more post-materialism (Table X): 
Table X
In the post-Socialist region only Belarus fell out of the pattern with an increase in choosing “pay.” Among
the Western democracies Spain and Japan deviate from the pattern. 
The idea that economic hardship actually pushes people into choosing post-materialist values is not a new
one. (11) Thus, Clarke and Dutt argued that rising levels of unemployment are conducive to post-materialist
values. It could be the case that unemployment in the post-Socialist region pushes people towards less
materialism when different indicators are used. Considering a rise in choosing “pay” among the Western
public actually agrees with Inglehart’s recent findings. Looking at the picture we can see that the level of
post-materialism is dropping since 1990 on for the Western societies: 
Figure 7 
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3.2. Testing Materialism in the 1970s
Is it possible to determine which out of the two hypotheses takes predominance in explaining high levels of
materialism among the post-Socialist elderly? Unfortunately, it is possible to do this with time-series data.
For example, Inglehart concluded that during dramatic recessions in Western Europe period effects (scarcity
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period effects are responsible for high levels of materialism among the old post-Socialist groups. However,
we should know whether older people were more materialist during the Soviet era. If it could only be
determined that the elderly were more materialist already during the Socialist era, then the cohort effects
can be conclusively ruled in and added to the evident period effects! If the data show that the elderly were
less materialist during Socialism, it means that today they changed their values dramatically. 
With some approximation, it is possible to suggest that even as early as in the late-70s young people in the
bloc gravitated towards post-materialist values, such as freedom of speech. The Soviet Interview Project was
conducted beginning in 1979.(13) Although the original battery of questions was not administered to the
respondents, there are some indicators that allow us to place age cohorts towards either materialist or post
materialist end. For example, on the question “Does the respondent read Samizdat (underground reactionary
publishing) material?” (1=yes, 2=no) we observe the next relationship among age cohorts: 
Figure 8 
The conclusion can be made that because younger cohorts were interested in Samizdat much more compared
to the older cohorts, the young were more likely to value freedom of speech more. 
Possibly, the level of materialism for the Socialist period could also be inferred from its possible
relationship with other variables. If we trust Inglehart’s 1990s relationship between economic well-being,
materialism, and life satisfaction, then we could assume that in 1979 older cohorts were more materialist
than the young since their life satisfaction was lower. For example, here is life satisfaction by age in Eastern
Europe from the 1995 World Value Survey: 
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Figure 9 
A similar trend is roughly observable among the Russian-Jewish immigrants in 1979: 
Figure 10 
The older cohorts in 1979 also reported decreasing standards of living in comparison with the young: 
Figure 11 
However, we did not observe the same social stratification between cohorts in the 1970s as in the 1990s. In
particular, in a simple comparison of means we can see that the net income in 1979 did not vary a lot
throughout cohorts: 
Table XI 
The income ranged from 118 to 182 rubles a month. 
There were also rank-type of questions administered in the 1979 survey. The results could be said
misleading. For example, the respondents were asked what they would like to keep from the old system if
there had been an opportunity to change it. “Free public education,” “Free health care,” “Cheap public
housing,” were the leading choices among the younger respondents, which would indicate their anti-market
attitudes at the time. However, the young were inclined to allow private enterprise and change the existing
political system. 
Table XII
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were definitely inclined towards more liberalism. It means that they might have scored higher on
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4. Conclusion
With regard to the post-Socialist bloc, the importance of measuring political culture cannot be
overemphasized. The region is facing social and economic transformations, and the relative success of
adopting market oriented reforms, democratic reforms, or any other policies will ultimately depend on the
values predominant within the post-Socialist societies. For example, according to Inglehart,
post-materialism correlates positively with environmental awareness. Therefore, if we observe a high level
of materialism in the post-Socialist bloc, then we will not see the triumph of Russia’s Green parties any time
soon. 
At the same time, it is known that there is acute environmental awareness in Russia and Eastern Europe,
and, as this paper shows, there is a very high level of materialism. This would contradict Inglehart’s
findings. However, in a context different from the OECD countries, it could also mean two things: 1) either
people’s concerns reflect the relative scarcity of a phenomenon (thus, both the environment and inflation
represent a concern); or 2) the vales space (or value dimension) between Western Europe and Eastern
Europe is not the same. Eastern Europe could be, in fact, objectively less materialist compared to Western
Europe, but this fact is not captured by currently used indicators. 
This analysis reveals a number of important methodological points. First, the original Inglehart’s battery of
questions could be too sensitive to the post-Socialist development. It is important to keep in mind that
Inglehart’s battery is meant to measure a subjective level of materialism - that is, the level of materialism
with respect to post-materialist values within a country. This means that if Eastern Europe scores higher on
materialist indicators compared to the West, it does not mean that objectively East Europeans value
materialism more than the West. That can be shown by comparing the responses to scale type of questions
instead of rank type of questions on possible materialist and post-materialist indicators. 
Second, it was suggested that perhaps the generational effect existed as far back as in the 1970 in the region.
Also, the elderly are currently experiencing economic hardship compared to the young in the region. Thus,
today the elderly score higher on materialism due to generational as well as period effects. 
Third, perhaps further research is needed to answer two questions conclusively: whether the region is
objectively more materialist compared to the Western-type democracies; which direction is the region
moving: materialist or postmaterialist. Considering that the original battery is taken out of the West
European context, we should look at some indicators which would not be susceptible to short-term
fluctuation in economic conditions. 
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Materialism by age groups in Eastern Europe and the former
USSR, selected countries, ISSP 1993 (Environment) 
ages 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-high average
material 40 41 44 44 57 58 47
posmaterial 7 6 5 5 3 1,5 5
Table II
Materialism by age groups in Western Europe, selected countries,
ISSP 1993 Environment
ages 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-high average
material 16 18 19 23 27 29 21
postmaterial 15 15 14 14 11 10 8
Figure 1
Materialism and GDP per capita in Western and Eastern Europe,
1993
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Materialism by GDP per capita in Eastern Europe, 1993 (R=0.752) 
 
Table III
Russia: mean earnings by age group, 1993
Ages Mean N
1 301862 249
2 223089 400
3 207413 483
4 168934 290
5 104470 270
6 128126 166
Table IV
Bulgaria: mean earnings by age group, 1993
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1 123625 66
2 130186 119
3 115595 178
4 93903 154
5 49035 213
6 13307 257
Figure 3
Relationship between age groups and earnings in Eastern Europe 
 
Table V
The US: mean earnings by age groups, 1993
Ages Mean N
1 7203 82
2 18328 261
3 24147 313
4 29231 188
5 29532 106
6 24560 46
Figure 4
Relationship between age groups and earnings in Western
democracies
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Table VI
Materialism by age group in Eastern Europe and former USSR:
Second Battery of indicators from WVS 1995
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-high average
material 42 47 50 54 59 62 52
postmaterial 6 5 4 3 3 2 4
Table VII
Materialism and GDP in Eastern Europe: 1990, 1993, and 1995 
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tambov na na 0,63 na na na na
azerbaijan na na 0,58 na na 1790 1550
russia 0,36 0,61 0,54 9211 6120 4820 4370
moldova na na 0,54 na na 2670 1500
ukraine na na 0,51 na na 3650 2190
georgia na na 0,44 na na 1060 1960
montenegro na na 0,47 na na na na
serbia na na 0,45 5464 na 1000 na
hungary 0,49 0,35 0,43 6108 5380 5700 7200
belarus 0,27 na 0,43 na na 5130 4850
armenia na na 0,41 na na 2290 2360
lithania 0,15 na 0,4 na na 3500 4220
macedonia na na 0,37 na na 900 na
poland na 0,46 0,35 4565 4400 4920 6520
estonia 0,26 na 0,35 na na 6460 5240
latvia 0,18 na 0,31 na na 4480 1300
bosnia na na 0,29 na na na na
croatia na na 0,14 na na 2640 4780
slovena 0,23 0,17 0,05 na 10700 8110 11800
czech 0,13 0,22 na na 7300 7450 10510
moscow 0,14 na na na na na na
romania 0,37 na na 3445 2700 2790 na
bulgaria 0,2 0,54 0,49 5710 3800 3830 4010
slovakia 0,21 na na na 6100 6070 na
Figure 5
Materialism by GDP per capita in Eastern Europe, 1995
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Figure 6
GDP per capita and future expectation in Eastern Europe, 1995
 
Table VIII
Mean percentage of job aspects by importance for Western and
Eastern Europe, WVS, 1990 and 1995
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West 31 70 66 66 54 72 46 57 41 45
East 13 64 35 52 63 67 48 66 31 40
Table IX
Importance of “pay” for the West by age group, 1990 and 1995
cohorts 1 2 3 4 5 6
West % 25 24,5 25,5 27 33 35,5
1 represents the youngest age group 
Table X
Mean percentage of choosing “pay” (WVS, 1990 and 1995 waves)
  1990 1995
Poland 53 10
Belarus 13 18
Slovenia 18 11
Bulgaria 9 6
Lithuania 21 5
Latvia 31 10
Estonia 14 10
Russia 17 9
West Germany 26 35
Spain 23 24
USA 14 17
Finland 34 40
Japan 21 12
Norway 40 41
Sweden 27 40
Figure 7
Materialism minus post-materialism for Western Europe
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Taken from Inglehart, 1994. 
Figure 8
NOT Reading Samizdat by age groups among Soviet immigrants,
1979
 
1 indicating "read very often" 
Here age increases from 2 to 12 
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Life satisfaction in Easter Europe by age groups
 
10 indicating "very satisfied" and 1 indicating "very dissatisfied" 
Figure 10
Life satisfaction among Soviet immigrants, 1979
 
1 indicating "very dissatisfied" 
Figure 11
Reported standard of living by age groups, 1979
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1 indicating "high standards" and 5 indicating "low standards" 
Table XI
Monthly salary at last job, USSR, 1979
ages mean N
2 118 169
3 137 356
4 156 543
5 172 295
6 182 464
7 180 259
8 171 280
9 169 296
10 158 202
11 139 260
12 159 55
Age increases from 2 to 12 
Table XII
Favoring private enterprise by age groups (1 is the youngest among
Soviet immigrants, 1979
ages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
change political system 24 33 58 34 44 25 25 24 14 19
allow private enterprise 14 10 10 10 10 8 12 8 8 1
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